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Preface 
This study on "The car industry in the Republic of Korea", has been 
prepared for the research project on "Adjustment to structural change in 
manufacturing: A North-South perspective" undertaken under the umbrella of 
the ILO's International Division of Labour Programme. Its author is Sung-Hwan 
Jo, Professor of Economics at Sogang University in Seoul. 
The structure of world production and trade changes continuously, opening 
up new job opportunities and threatening existing ones. This process of 
change causes considerable adjustment problems affecting the lives of millions 
of workers and their families in both industrialised and developing 
countries. In view of their potentially far-reaching consequences these 
changes need to be analysed in depth. Critical issues should be identified in 
time. The different options (and their consequences) open to policy-makers 
and other concerned parties must also be examined. These are the principal 
concerns of the research undertaken by the ILO1s International Division of 
Labour Programme. 
In this situation of constant change, where causes and effects are often 
hard to separate, it is not easy to guess what the future will bring. Certain 
trends may be discernible but many uncertainties remain. It is particularly 
important - but often very hard - to recognise which changes are cyclical and 
which structural. To what extent is unused capacity and unemployment in a 
particular industry related to low overall demand and to what extent are 
long-term structural factors at work? 
The developing countries play an important role in the process of struc-
tural change. Their share of world manufactured production and trade has 
increased in the last few decades. So far, most of this greater share 
originates in few countries only (the newly industrialising countries -
NICs) . At first, developing country exports tended to be concentrated in 
industries using little capital and relatively simple technology. Gradually, 
however, the range of their exports expanded and came to include steel, ships, 
machine tools, colour TVs, videotape recorders, petrochemicals, arms and 
aircraft. 
In more recent years, protectionism and the use of new technologies have 
tended to slow down the advance of developing countries exports in certain 
product areas. This has allowed industrialised countries to regain ground in 
some "traditional" industries. But it has also encouraged developing country 
exporters to accelerate their move into the production and export of more 
sophisticated products. A situation appears to be emerging in which most 
industrial goods using mature technologies can be produced in a large number 
of (industrialised and newly industrialising) countries. Sectors that use and 
generate the very latest technologies are exceptions. 
Capital has become increasingly internationally mobile and this has 
contributed to an acceleration of structural change. It has also made labour 
adjustments more difficult. Capital can be moved by telex, but people move 
more slowly. Workers need to adjust to changing circumstances, to be trained 
and retrained. But this takes time. It is therefore essential that the 
social partners and workers in particular are aware at an early stage of the 
scope and the consequences of the structural changes taking place and expected 
to take place. This will allow them to take timely action to reduce 
individual and social risk and the costs that these entail. 
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This research project takes as its point of departure the growing 
similarity among the issues related to industrial adjustment in industrial-
ised countries, and those related to industrialisation in the more advanced 
developing countries. Two operational questions that the project tries to 
answer are: (1) to what extent has industry relocated from North to South; 
and (2) to what extent is this trend currently being arrested or reversed? It 
looks for the causes and consequences of this relocation process and attempts, 
through a comparison of four different sectors, to come up with general 
conclusions. 
The project is organised at three levels: 
1. Global studies on clothing, steel, automobiles and aircraft ask to 
which extent the industry has relocated, whether in more recent times this 
trend is being reversed, and what the underlying causes of the relocation 
process are. The four sectors chosen represent a wide range of industry 
characteristics: some are dominated by small and medium enterprises, others 
have predominantly multinational or public ownership; some use more labour 
intensive, others more capital or high-tech intensive methods of production; 
some are stagnating, others expanding. It is hoped that by taking industries 
which differ from each other in these respects (and so reflect the 
heterogeneous situation prevailing in many other industries) some more 
universally valid conclusions will emerge. 
2. Selected case studies, focusing on the situation in one sector in one 
country, provide examples of how adjustment - successful or unsuccessful - has 
taken place in concrete cases. These studies compare different business 
strategies in the same sector; ask how workers have reacted to different 
strategies; and to what extent government policies have helped or hindered 
the adjustment process. 
3. Conceptual studies 
* * * 
This study recounts the recent phenomenal success of the motor vehicle 
industry in the Republic of Korea. If present growth rates are maintained the 
country will be the fifth largest car producer in the world by 1990. As 
little as seven years ago, the country had virtually abandoned the idea of 
promoting motor vehicle production as a strategic export industry for the 
1980s, but thanks to growth rates of 20 per cent (1983-84), 42.6 per cent 
(1984-85) and 60 per cent (1985-86), it reached - in 1987 - a level of exports 
of passenger cars similar to or exceeding that of Italy or Sweden. 
The industry consists of three main producers. The activities of two of 
these - Kia and Daewoo - are very closely woven into the global production 
structure of the two largest United States automobile multinationals. Sales 
in the United States take place through the existing network of these 
multinationals. The case of Hyundai, the largest producer, is different 
however, as it has taken a much more independent course and has set up its own 
overseas sales network through exclusive dealership arrangements. Hyundai is 
also the only producer that has reached the minimum efficient level for 
realising economies of scale for a single car model. 
Hyundai was the best selling imported car in Canada in 1985 and 1986. Its 
success was due to good quality production at low cost, including labour 
costs, but also due to some "special" factors. It benefited from the import 
duty privileges related to its developing country status. It also had the 
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good fortune to enter the market when a demand boom coincided with "voluntary" 
export restraints (VERs) of Japanese producers. Such Japanese export 
restrictions also favourably influenced the firm's successful entry into the 
United States market. 
The domestic content of passenger cars is in excess of 85 per cent. Local 
production of components has not ceased to increase. Nevertheless, the 
Republic of Korea car industry still depends heavily on imports for the supply 
of critical parts and components. The reliance on import of foreign 
technologies for its technical improvement is a drawback, the study argues, 
and there is an urgent need to improve the local research and development 
capacity. 
The comparative advantage of producing low-cost subcompact cars has 
shifted from Western Europe in the 1960s, to Japan in the 1970s, and to newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) such as the Republic of Korea in the 1980s, 
the study states. These NICs have a relatively abundant well-educated and 
(semi-) skilled labour force and have managed to cpmbine successfully mature 
technologies with low labour costs. These advantages, however, may not last. 
Production costs will increase as wages rise and the revaluation of the won 
(against the US dollar) continues. Higher import barriers can be expected in 
North America. This, the study argues, will make it imperative for Republic 
of Korean automakers to set up more production facilities abroad and to 
diversify into the export of high quality compact and medium-sized cars. 
As their name indicates, working papers are an intermediate form of 
presenting research findings. Any comments provoked by this paper are 
therefore most welcome. 
Gijsbert van Liemt 
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I. A Brief Review of Development Phases of the Korean Cor Industry and Government 
Policies (1962 - 1987) 
The Korean car industry has passed through several distinct phases of development 
and setback in the last quarter century. 
The first phase(1962 - 66) was started with the establishment in 1962 of the two 
forerunners of automobile assembling companies, Saenala and Hadonghwan, which were 
later dissolved or merged into other companies. Prior to 1962, a small number of new 
and second-hand cars had been imported under heavy custom duties and prohibitive 
consumption taxes. The industry in this initial phase could be considered as a 
typical "import - processing" industry in the sense that the semiHcnocked-down 
components imported from foreign car manufacturers were locally assembled at final 
stage of production. The industry was thoroughly protected under the Motor Vehicle 
Industry Protection Law enacted in 1962, an elaborate protectionists scheme that 
virtually prohibited the importation of assembled vehicles and of foreign parts and 
components not related to assembling uses. In 1964, Sinjin Motor Vehicle Industrial 
Company was established. This new company started two years later to assemble the 
basic Toyota subompact model, Corona, under licensing arrangements with Toyota of 
Japan. In 1965, Asia Motor Company was established and began to negotiate with Fiat 
of Italy for technological licensing arrangements. 
The second phase (1967 - 71) could be marked by the beginning of local production 
of some parts and components previously imported from foreign manufacturers. The 
Korean car industry was gradually turned into an "import-substitution" industry in the 
sense that local production of complete knocked-down parts and components was pushed 
to as great extent possible and that division of labor and specialization was 
encouraged among local suppliers of parts and components under the Basic Plan for 
Promotion of Motor Vehicle Industry proclaimed in 1967. Hyundai Motor Company was 
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established in 1968 and started to assemble Cortina, the basic English Ford suboompact 
model, with imported and domestically produced parts, under licensing arrangements 
with Ford Motor Company of England. In 1970, Asia Motor Co mpany began to assemble 
Fiat 124. In the same year, Kia Industrial Company which had been established as a 
bicycle manufacturer in 1940*s began to assemble small-sized pick-up trucks under 
licensing arrangements with Toyogogio Company (JNfezda ) of Japan. By the end of 1971, 
the five automakers, namely, Hadonghwan (later renamed as Dong-A), Shinjin, Asia, 
Hyundai and Kia, were engaged in assembling passenger cars and commercial vehicles 
with imported and locally produced components and parts. The percentage share of 
locally produced parts in total value added was around 50% in 1971. 
The third phase (1972 - 76) was characterized by the development of "indigenous" 
models of passenger cars which was promoted under the Long-Term Plan for Motor Vehicle 
Industry Promotion drawn up by the Korean Government in 1973. GMC - Korea (QIC) 
(the forerunner of Daewoo Motor Co.) was established as a 50:50 joint-venture company 
between Shinjin and General Motor Company in 1972. This joint-venture company started 
to assemble Chevy 1700, a Korean variant of the suboompact model originally developed 
by the German GMC subsidiary (OPEL). In 1974, Kia which had taken over Asia, 
started to assemble small suboompaots, BRISA, under licensing arrangements with 
Toyogogio of Japan, the manufacturers of Mazda models. In 1975, Hyundai introduced 
Korea's first indigenous model, PONY, and GMC-Korea began to market Gemini, a Korean 
variant of the GMC world-car model initially developed by OPEL (Germany) and improved 
by Isuzu (Japan). By 1976 the proportion of local content of passenger cars assembled 
by the three car manufacturers, GMC-Korea, Kia, and Hyundai, reached around 85 
percent. It was during this period when the Korean Government began to promote 
division of labor and specialization between automakers and component suppliers and 
among suppliers. Such a policy was incorporated into the Laws Governing the Promotion 
of Small-Medium Industry Specialization enacted in 1975. 
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The fourth phase (1977 - 82) can be marked as a period of restructuring and 
transition towards mass - production system of the Korean car industry. 
Local demand for passenger cars and commercial vehicles began to grow rapidly from 
the second half of the 1970* s. More than 200 thousand units of motor vehicles were 
produced and about 30 thousand units were exported during 1979. The car industry 
expanded its productive capacity to meet rapidly increasing local demand for passenger 
cars. In 1979, the government designated the car industry as one of the ten strategic 
industries to be promoted in the 1980's and selected 228 enterprises as the 
"officially approved" suppliers who would specialize in production of 59 major auto 
components and parts. 
The second-oil crisis at the end of the 1970's hit hard the Korean car industry. 
Local demand for cars fell sharply, plant utilization rate went down, and inventories 
accumulated. The government and the car industry in this politically unoertain (after 
the assasination of President Park) and economically depressed period between 1979 and 
1981 almost abandoned any idea of promoting the car industry as a strategic export 
industry for the 1980's. Between 1980 and 1981, the government and the car industry 
took a series of measures to restructure and rationalize the car industry. The final 
outcome for restructuring the motor vehicle industry worked out between the government 
and automakers was as follows : (a) both Hyundai and Daewoo (GMC-Korea)* were to 
manufacture passenger cars (Kia would be permitted to manufacture passenger cars after 
five years) ; (b) Kia alone was to manufacture light-weight trucks under 5 tons ; and 
(o) all the existing three automakers (Hyundai, Daewoo, and Kia) were permitted to 
manufacture heavy-weight trucks and buses ; and such restrictions would be removed at 
the end of five years and then free entry would prevail. 
* Daewoo replaced Shinjin as the Korean partner of QIC-Korea in 1978, 
and subsequently this 50:50 joint-venture company changed its name 
from GMC-Korea to Daewoo Motor Corporation. 
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The current phase (from 1982 to the present) can be considered as the period for 
consolidating and expanding the export base for the Korean car industry. From the 
second half of 1982, the car industry was phased out of the severe and prolonged 
recession. The sales of motor vehicles reached 220,000 units, a record-breaking 
sales, in 1983. Hundai's successful exports of PONY II, an improved model of Pony, to 
the Canadian market which had began in 1983 was a decisive turning point in 
Korea's car exports. The exports of Korean passenger cars increased from 16,340 units 
in 1983 to 48,630 units in 1984, to 119,099 units in 1985 and again to 298,702 units 
in 1986. When the export targets set by the three automakers for 1987 are added up, 
the total would reach around 700,000 units. 
Hyundai's entry into the U.S. market with its new front-wheel drive PONY EXCELL in 
1986 proved a phenomenal success. Hyundai sold 168,000 PONY EXCELL*s and its 
variants in the IJ.S. market for 1986 and has set target sales of more than a 
quarter million cars in the U.S. market for 1987. The company's productive capacity 
expanded from the existing capacity of 400,000 cars/year to 700,000 cars/year by 
the end of 1987. 
Daewoo, a joint-venture company with General Motor Company, introduced its own 
version of the world oar, LEMANS, to local market in 1986 and began to export LEMANS 
to the U.S. market through the Pontiac distribution channels from the middle of 1987. 
Daewoo is planning to sell somewhere between 80,000 and 100,000 cars in the U.S. 
market by the middle of 1988. The company is doubling its existing capacity of 
170,000 cars/year. 
Kia which had developed a subcompact model jointly with Toyogogio introduced its 
local model, PRIDE, to the local market in February, 1987. The export model of Kia's 
subcompact, FESTIVA, which is identical to PRIDE, was introduced in the U.S. through 
the Ford distribution channels from the second half of 1987. The company is planning 
to sell about 40,000 units of FESTIVA in the U.S. in the initial year. Kia is also 
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expanding its productive capacity from the level of 120,000 unit/year to that of 
150,000 units/year, and has a medium-sized (compact) car model called CONCORD to local 
market introduced. 
Tong-A motor Company which had been producing Jeeps for local market was recently 
acquired by Ssangyong group. The company is developing a wagon-type model of 
passenger car to be introduced in local market sometime before 1990. The company is 
also planning to export buses and trucks under licensing arrangements with Japanese 
(Nissan) and European automakers in near future. It recently acquired Panther, a 
small British automaker, to serve as a European base for passenger car export and 
automobile technology import. 
More than 800 component suppliers are producing auto parts and components for 
local manafaoturers and foreign suppliers. Many of these suppliers have joint-venture 
and/or technological licensing and subcontracting arrangements with foreign partners 
for quality improvement and overseas export expansion. 
In promoting the exports of passenger cars, the Korean government does not offer 
any special export incentives to the motor vehicle industry. It offers the same 
incentives to the passenger car exports as those to any other industrial exports, in 
eluding tax reduction, exemptions from custom duties on imported meterials, loans, and 
export insurance. 
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II. The Performance of the Korean oar Industry 
(1) Output Performance 
The relative position of the Korean motor vehicle industry * (including part 
suppliers) in the Korean economy is summarized in Table II—1. As of the end of 1984, 
the latest year for which the manufacturing census data are available, the motor 
vehicle industry occupies 2.8 percent in manufacturing employment and about 3.5 
percent each in manufacturing output and value added, respectively. The percentage 
figures must have much risen after 1984. Such statistics do not reveal the dynamic 
aspects of rapid transformation taking place in the industry in the last several 
years. As the Korean economy from the second half of 1982 came to recover from 
prolonged and severe recessions related to oil shocks, subsequent world-wide 
recession , and domestic political uncertainty, the Korean motor vehicle industry 
gradually recovered from a near collapse of local market for motor vehicles. As shown 
in Table II—2» the output of motor vehicles grew rapidly to meet growing local demand 
and explosive overseas demand in subsequent years. Output grew by nearly 20 
percent between 1983 and 1984, by 42.6 percent between 1984 and 1985, and by nearly 60 
percent between 1985 and 1986, respectively. Between 1983 and 1986, Korea's exports 
of passenger cars and commercial vehicles increased from 25,000 units in 1983 to 
306,000 units in 1986, a twelvehold increase. Such an explosive increase in car 
exports raised the share of passenger oars in total output of motor vehicles to 75 
percent by the end of 1986. ** 
* The motor vehicle industry in this paper covers production of passenger cars, 
trucks and buses, whereas the car industry refers only to car production. 
** A detailed breakdown of the output performance of the motor vehicle 
in.-dustry is presented in Appendix Table A-l. 
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Table II - 1 The Position of Korea's Motor Vehicle Industry 
(As of the end of 1984) 
Manufacturing 
sector 
Machine tool 
Manufacturing 
Sub-Sector 
Motor Vehicle 
Industry 
Number of 
Establishments 
(1,000) 
41.5 
(100%) 
10.4 
(25.2%) 
.676 
(1.6%) 
Number of 
Employees 
(1.000) 
2.343.6 
(100%) 
708.7 
(30.2%) 
64.6 
(2.8%) 
Output 
( million 
won) 
71,305.4 
(100%) 
19.374.3 
(27.2%) 
2.946.8 
(3.5%) 
Value Added 
(million 
won) 
24.654.4 
(100%) 
7.339.0 
(29.8%) 
832.0 
(3.4%) 
Sources : Mining and Manufacturing Census (Economic Planning Board, April, 1986) 
Table II - 2 Output Performance of Korea's Motor Vehicle Industry 
(Unit : Thousand) 
year 
ouput 
local use 
export 
1983 
221 
195 
25 
1984 
265 
210 
52 
(19.9%)* 
(7.7%) 
(108%) 
1985 
378 
246 
123 
(42.6%) 
(17.1%) 
(136.5%) 
1986 
602 
295 
306 
(59.3%) 
(20%) 
(148.9%) 
Source : Korea Automotive Industry Co-Operative Association 
Note * : Figures in parentheses are rates of increase over previous year 
Stimulated by growing local demand for cars and by record-breaking car exports, 
the three existing automakers, Hyundai. Daewoo, and Kia are all expanding their 
existing productive capacity. As shown in Table I1-3, the combined output of 
passenger cars produced by these automakers jumped from 66.6 thousand units in 1981 to 
455.3 thousand units in 1986. As of the end of 1986, Hyundai, the industry's leader, 
delivered nearly 90 percent of the industry*s total output, and Daewoo picked up the 
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Table II - 3 The Output of Passenger Cars by the Three Major Automakers 
(unit : car) 
year 
Name 
of Firm 
Kia 
Daewoo 
Hyundai 
Total 
1981 
4.753 
(7.1) 
8,888 
(13.3) 
52,961 
(70.6) 
66,602 
(100.0) 
1982 
535 
(0.6) 
14,855 
(15.9) 
78,071 
(83.5) 
93,451 
(100.0) 
1983 
136 
(0.1) 
27,406 
(22.7) 
83.015 
(77.2) 
120.557 
(100.0) 
1984 
— 
33,876 
(21.6) 
123,110 
(78.4) 
156,986 
(100.0) 
1985 
— 
36,805 
(14.0) 
225,970 
(86.0) 
252,775 
(100.0) 
1986 
26 
(0.0) 
47,082 
(10.3) 
408,177 
(89.7) 
455,285 
(100.0) 
1) 
1987 
85,000 
150,000 
450,000 
685,000 
Source : Korea Automotive Industry Co-operative Association 
Notes 1) : The 1987 figures are the targets set by individual automakers. 
remaining 10 percent. Kia just entered the market for passenger' cars from the 
beginning of 1987. During the first half of 1987, Hyundai increased the productive 
capacity of its Ulsan assembly plant by 300 thousand cars/year to the total capacity 
of 700 thousand cars/year. The company is looking for a second plant site near Seoul 
to increase its total assembling capacity up to the level of one million cars/year by 
1989 or 1990. In addition, Hyundai is constructing its subsidiary in Canada. The 
company is also developing a new medium-sized car model called "y-2". Daewoo is 
doubling its Leraans plant capacity from the existing level of 160 thousand cars/year 
to 330 thousand cars/year. Kia, which was once bankrupt but reorganized 
later through the ownership take-over (90% of total shares) by its employees, 
introduced a smaller suboompact car named PRIDE in local market (FESTIVA in the U.S. 
market) from early 1987 after a phenomenal success in sales of small vans and 
trucks in local market. 
Dong-A Motor Company, a newly acquired subsidiary of Ssangyong group, is expected 
to introduce its wagorr-type passenger cars sometime before 1990. 
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As shown in Table 11-4, not only oar exports expanded from 16.4 thousand oars in 
1981 to nearly 300 thousand cars in 1986, but also the exports of automobile parts and 
components by hundreds of suppliers jumped from US$66.2 million in 1981 to US$164.5 
million in 1986. 
Table 11-4 Exports of Passenger Cars and Automotive Components 
unit : Passenger cars : car 
Automotive parts : U3$ 1,000 
year 
firm 
Kia 
Daewoo 
Hyundai 
Total 
Automotive 
parts 
1981 
823 
155 
15,199 
16,177 
66,212 
1982 
380 
114 
13,753 
14,067 
67,511 
1983 
— 
288 
16,052 
16,340 
73,729 
1984 
— 
444 
48,186 
48,630 
107.655 
1985 
— 
516 
118,583 
119,099 
148,951 
1986 
26 
712 
297,964 
298,702 
264,549 
Source : Korea Automotive Industry Co-operative Association 
(2) Automotive Technology 
The over-all level of automotive technology in Korea is at present far below that 
in the U.S., Japan and Western European countries despite ever-increasing import of 
technological know-how and assistance from the advanced countries and indigenous 
efforts toward automotive technology development. The Korean automakers are "nearly" 
competitive with their advanced-country counterparts in manufacturing technology, but 
lag far behind them in design technology for engines and otbpr major components. 
Table 11-5 summarizes a self-evaluation of the Korean automakers* manufacturing 
technology. 
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Pressing, milling, etc. 
Heat treatment 
Soldering technology 
Painting 
Assembling technology 
Inspection system 
B 
B 
B 
A 
A 
B 
Table I1-5 The Evaluation of Passenger-Car Manufacturing Technology 
Process Technical Level Areas of Deficiencies 
Product design C CAD System application, technical 
knowledge of body structure 
Die-casting and Forging B Reduction of losses, production 
automation, heat treatment 
Precision molding, FMS technology 
Heat treatment of special materials 
energy-saving technology 
Production automation including robotics 
Work by robots 
Assembling automation 
Safety inspection, noise testing 
Sources : Own surveys of the Korean Automakers 
A : The advanced - country level 
B : Between the advanced and the competitor countries 
C : The competitor - country level 
The Korean car industry is also very weak in areas of heat treatment technology 
and new material development. Such a basic weakness in designs and material 
technology in Korea is quite serious in view of the recent trend in the advanced 
countries (the U.S. and Japan) toward developing new light-weight materials and 
wide-spread incorporation of electronic devices into automotive components. In areas 
of product quality, Korean automakers are also far behind their advanced-country 
counterparts. 
The level of fuel economy of the Korea-exported suboompact cars (Pony Exoell, 
Lemans, and Festiva) is far above the minimum standards set in the U.S. and Japan and 
is comparable with the Japanese suboompact cars such as Nissan Centra and Honda Civic. 
The Korea-exported subcompact cars passed the EC and Canadian standards for gas 
emission control, but have so far failed to meet the U.S. and Japanese standards. The 
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Korean cars exported to the U.S. are equipped with imported emission control devices. 
Korean passenger cars have passed the EC and Canadian safety standards and all 
those cars exported to the U.S. have passed the U.S. safety standards. 
As to durability test, the Korea-exported passenger cars are considered to be 
slightly below the international standards mainly due to low-quality plating, painting 
and coating jobs and substandard heat-treatment technology. 
Most Korea-exported cars are of front-wheel drive type and all the new models to 
be introduced for local and export market will also be of front-wheel drive type. 
(3) R & D Efforts 
The Korean car industry from its inception in 1962 has been relying on foreign 
automotive technology imported through licensing agreements and/or joint ventures for 
which an ever-increasing amount of royalty payments has been made. It is the 
continuous inflow of technological know-how from the advanced countries that the gap 
between the local and the foreign technical levels has been gradually narrowed. It is 
through adaptation of the imported technology to mass production system that technical 
know-how, skills and workmanship have greatly accumulated in the Korean car industry 
and its supporting industries. A consensus among automotive industry experts is that, 
except in the area of design technology which the avanced countries have not much 
transferred to Korea, the Korean car industry has, by and large, assimilated and 
improved over the imported automotive technologies. 
Tables 11-6 and II—7 show an upward trend in the inflow of automotive technology 
through licensing agreenemts and joint ventures. Most notable in these tables is a 
sharp increase since 1384 in licensing arrangements and joint-ventures between local 
suppliers of components and their foreign partners. Table I1-8 shows that the 
Japanese are the predominant foreign licensors and joint-venture partners. 
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Table II-9 shows R&D expenditure as percentage of sales value in the Korean oar 
industry since 1984. The percentage increased from 2.3 percent in 1984 to 3.4 percent 
in 1986, and is projected to remain around 3 percent through 1990. 
The total stock of R&D manpower and expertise in the Korean car industry is small 
at present, largely because the industry has heavily relied on the import of foreign 
technologies for its technical improvement. It is only in very recent years that 
Korean car industry has made a really serious effort to develop and secure R&D 
manpower resources. About 2,200 R&D workers are currently employed in nine research 
institutes established by individual Korean automakers and automotive component 
suppliers. 
No govemmant or serai-goverment automotive research institute is in existence. 
Investment expenditure made by Korean automakers for high-tech R&D activities in the 
areas of new basic materials development, electronic system and controls, alternative 
engines, emission controls, and others is quite meager. At the present moment, it is 
beyond the financial and technical capability of private enterprises to undertake 
Table I1-6 
Annual Inflow of Technological Lioensings by Car 
Manufacturers (Number of Cases) 
firm year 
Kia 
Daewoo 
Hyundai 
Total 
1981 
0 
1 
3 
4 
1982 
2 
0 
4 
6 
1983 
1 
2 
5 
8 
1984 
2 
6 
7 
15 
1985 
1 
2 
4 
9 
1986 * 
1 
2 
3 
6 
Total 
9 
13 
26 
48 
Sources : Korea Development Bank 
Notes * : The 1986 figures cover the number of cases up to April 30, 1986. 
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Table II~7 
Annual Inflow of Joint Ventures and Technological Licensing Agreements 
for Production of Automotive Components (Number of Cases) 
year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986« 
total 
Joint Venture 
1 
3 
7 
10 
21 
Technological Licensing 
6 
10 
10 
8 
14 
22 
90 
160 
Source : Korea Development Bank 
Note * : Estimates 
Table I1-8 
Nationality of Joint-Venture Partners & Licensors 
in Production of Automotive Components (198Q-1985) 
Nationality 
Japan 
U. S. A. 
England 
W. Germany 
Switzerland 
Joint Venture 
4 
5 
1 
1 
0 
Technological Licensing 
44 
7 
9 
9 
1 
Source : Korea Development Bank 
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Table I1-9 
The Current State and Projection of R & D Investment 
by Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
(Unit : billion won) 
R&D Investment (A) 
Sales Value (B) 
A / B (%) 
1984 
40 
1,700 
2.3 
1985 
61 
2.200 
2.8 
1986 
(plan) 
98 
2,900 
3.4 
1990 
(Projection) 
170 
5,800 
2.9 
Source : Korea Development Bank 
Notes 1) The 1990 figures are expressed in the 1986 prices. 
high-tech research activities. Many industry experts are stressing the need for the 
creation of public research institutes with sufficient funding and technical staffing 
which will join forces with private research units in development and application of 
high-level technology in automotive and related industries. 
(4) Supply of Components and Materials 
Assembling plants and equipment of the Korean car manufacturers are largely new 
and in good conditions mainly because a deoisive expansion of their productive 
capacity took place in recent years. Plants and equipment owned and operated by 
hundreds of automotive component suppliers are largely out-dated and in poor 
conditions. As of the end of 1985, 817 supplier firms were producing automotive 
parts, components, and accessories. 93.9 percent of these suppliers fall into the 
category of small-medium enterprises, and the remaining 6.7 percent into that of large 
enterprises, as shown in Table 11-10. 
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Table 11-10 
The Breakdown of Component Suppliers by Number 
of Employees (As of the end of 1985) 
(unit : person) 
Number of 
Employees 
Number of 
Firms 
below 
50 
395 
51-100 
165 
101-400 
186 
401-700 
16 
*) 
18 
701-1000 
12 
above 
1001 
25 
Souroes : Korea Automotive Industry Co-Operation Association 
Notes * ) : Among firms with 401-700 employees, 18 firms with assets 
worth more than 12 billion won were classified into large 
firms 
One can note from Table 11-11 that the Korean car industry as a whole depends 
heavily on import for supply of critical parts and components despite ever-expanding 
local production and exports of auto parts and components. As of the end of 1985, 
Korea imported more than exported auto parts and components in the ratio of two to 
one. The degree of self-sufficiency in the car industry, measured in terras of the 
ratio of net import (import - export) to the sum of local production and net import is 
about 87.24 percent. 
Table 11-11 
Output. Exports and Imports of Automotive Parts and Components 
(for passenger oars, buses, and trucks) 
(unit : US $ 1,000) 
Output 
Exports 
Imports 
1983 
926,461 
73,729 
339,821 
1984 
846,701 
107,665 
330,821 
1985 
1,199.169 
148,951 
301,459 
Souroes : Korea Automotive Industry Co-Operative Association 
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(5) Future Projections 
According to a study released in 1985 by Korea Institute for Economics and 
Technology (KIET), the output of motor vehicles in Korea is projected to grow at an 
annual average rate of 14.7 percent for the period between 1984 and 2000, far 
surpassing the projected rate of annual average growth of 8.6 percent of the 
manufacturing sector as a whole for the same projection period. In other words, the 
motor vehicle industry was projected to mate contributions to growth of GNP and 
exports twice as much as the manufacturing sector as a whole for the remainder of this 
century, as shown in Table 11-12. Table 11-13 shows that the industry's share in GNP, 
manufacturing output and exports was projected to increase from 1.31 percent, 3,64 
percent and 0.67 percent, respectively, in 1983 as a base year, to 2.9 percent, 6.6 
percent and 3.3 percent, respectively, in 1990, and again to 4.2 percent, 8.6 percent, 
and 5.3 percent, respectively, in 2000. These percentage figures projected by KIET 
seem to be on a much conservative side, considering the ever-expanding export and 
local demand for Korea-made passenger cars in recent years. 
The Korean car industry is still in its infancy in export business and is 
suffering from a host of weaknesses in high - tech areas, overseas marketing 
exp&-tise, consumer-credit arrangement, and so cm. The world economic outlook in 
general and the prospective overseas demand for passenger cars in particular are by no 
means optimistic. Under these circumstances, it is harzardous to make a long-term 
projection for the future demand for and supply potentials of the Korean car industry. 
Judging from the initial success in sales of Iftundai's PONY II in the Canadian market, 
a phenomenal success of Korean suboorapaots (PONY EXCELL and LEHANS) in the U.S. 
market, and a steady upward trend in local market demand for passenger cars and 
commercial vehicles, one can safely say that the prospect for Korea's motor vehicle 
industry is, by and large, promising at least up to year 1990. 
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The long-terra demand forecast presented in Table 11-14 was based on production 
plans submitted by individual automakers and the demand forecast made by Korea 
Automotive Industry Go-Operative Association. The total demand for passenger cars, 
buses, and trucks was projected to grow from 369 thousand units 1985, to 600 thousand 
units in 1986, to 980 thousand units in 1988, and to 1,320 thousand units in 1990. 
This means that the total demand is to grow at an annual average rate of 29 percent 
for the period between 1985 and 1990. The exports of passenger cars were projected to 
grow at an annual average rate of 44.1 percent from 119 thousand units in 1986 to 740 
thousand units in 1990. The exports of buses and trucks were projected to grow at an 
annual average rate of 49.6 percent between 1985 and 1990. Local demand for passenger 
cars was forecast to grow at an annual rate of 20.1 percent, and that for buses and 
trucks at an annual rate of 13.8 percent. 
Table 11-12 Growth Rates and Contributions of 
The Motor Vehicle Industry 
(unit : %) 
Motor Vehicle 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Sector 
Period 
1971 - 1983 
1984 - 2000 
1971 - 1983 
1984 - 2000 
Annual average 
rate of growth 
Value 
Added 
13.4 
14.7 
15.4 
8.6 
Export 
49.8 
28.9 
30.9 
12.6 
Contributions to GNP 
and Export growth 
G N P 
1.7 
5.6 
43.1 
51.4 
Total 
Export 
0.7 
5.9 
93.9 
72.1 
Sources : Korea Institute for Economics and Technology 
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Table 11-13 The Relative Position of the Motor Vehicle Industry 
(unit : %) 
Share in GNP 1) 
Share in Manufacturing Output 1) 
Share in Tatal Export 2) 
1983 
1.31 
3.64 
0.67 
Projections 
1990 
2.9 
6.6 
3.3 
2000 
4.2 
8.6 
5.3 
Sources : Korea Institute for Economics and Technology 
Notes 1) : 1980 constant prices 
2) : current U.S. dollar prices 
Table 11-14 Lang-Term Projections of Demand for Motor Vehicles 
(unit : 1,000 units) 
Passenger 
Cars 
Buses & 
, Trucks 
Total 
local 
demand 
exports 
total 
local 
dmuand 
exports 
total 
local 
demand 
exports 
total 
1988 
base 
year 
136 
119 
255 
110 
4 
114 
246 
123 
369 
1986 
165 
285 
450 
143 
7 
150 
308 
292 
600 
1993 
230 
540 
770 
180 
15 
195 
425 
555 
980 
1990 
340 
740 
1,080 
210 
30 
240 
550 
770 
1,320 
1985- 1990 
average growth 
rate (%) 
20.1 
44.1 
33.5 
13.8 
49.6 
16.1 
17.5 
44.3 
29.0 
Sources : Korea Development Bank 
- 18 -
Table 11-15 The Existing and Projected Productive Capacity 
of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
(unit : 1,000 units) 
Hyundai 
Daewoo 
Kia 
Dong-A 
Asia (Kia) 
Total 
1985 
440 
90 
133 
8 
14 
685 
1986 
600 
248 
268 
15 
24 
1,155 
1988 
750 
388 
304 
30 
24 
1,496 
1990 
1.100 
420 
438 
30 
50 
2,038 
Source : Korea Development Bank 
Table 11-15 summarizes the existing and planned productive capacity of the 
individual Korean automakers. The supply capacity for motor vehicles is expected to 
reach 1.52 million units/year by 1988, and to reach 2 million mark by 1990. The 
productive capacity of Hyundai alone would exceed one million cars/year. The sum 
total of the planned productive capacities of the existing five automakers (2,038 
thousand units as shown in Table 11-15) would exceed by 700 thousand cars/year the sum 
total (1,320 thousand units as shown in Table II - 14) of the projected export and 
local demand by the year 1990. 
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III. International Involvement and Competitiveness of the Korean Car Industry 
(1) Inflow of Technology and Capital 
The major forms of international economic involvement in the Korean car industry 
beyond the traditional forms of commodity imports and exports are joint-ventures, 
technological licensing, joint production, subcontracting, and marketing arrangements. 
As shown in Table III—1, the Korean automakers are involved in various forms of 
business co-operation with more than ten automakers from the advanced countries. 
Almost all international economic involvement by the Korean automakers has been on 
the receiving end of the inward flows of either technologies or financial capital or 
both from their counterparts in the advanced countries, mainly the U.S.A. and Japan. 
Exceptions to this general pattern are the outward direct investment by Hyundai in an 
assembling plant (100,000 cars/year capacity) in Newmarket, Ontario, Canada and the 
recent acquisition of Panther Motor Co. of England by Ssangyong Group. It is 
expected that the Korean car industry will largely remain on the receiving end in the 
flow of design technology, financial capital, and overseas marketing know-how by 1990 
or even beyond. Only after 1990, the managerial, technological and financial 
capability may reach somewhere near that of the advanced-country counterparts of 
today. It will be only then that the Korean automakers will be in a position to 
compete with their advanced-country counterparts in offering technological and 
managerial assistance to the later-comer automobile manufacturers in the developing 
countries of today. 
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Japanese presence is predominant and widespread in technological licensing 
agreements offered to the Korean automakers and component suppliers. Nissan of Japan 
has made technology and joint-production arrangements with Ssangyong Motor Company 
(formerly Dong-A) for production of trucks, passenger vans and buses. Toyota has 
maintained close business ties, through its subsidiaries, Hino and Daihatsu, with Kia 
and Ssangyong for production of heavy-weight trucks. Isuzu is offering technological 
licensing agreements to Daewoo for production of trucks and buses. MrPCb. has 
maintained close ties with Kia in joint development and production of passenger cars 
and small-sized trucks. Mitsubishi has participated in a joint venture (10% share 
participation) plus licensing agreements with Hyundai and is also engaged in joint 
production of buses with Hyundai. 
The American automakers are increasingly active in business involvement with 
Korean automakers in recent years. General Motor Company has been involved in a 50:50 
joint business venture with Daewoo for production of a wide range of passenger oars, 
trucks and components. Ford Motor Company has made financial and marketing arrange 
roents with Kia in overseas sales of passenger cars jointly developed by Kia and tfezda 
and offers technical licensing agreeements to Hyundai for production of medinm-sized 
passenger cars. Chrysler Motor Company has been in negotiation with Samsung Group 
for joint-production arrangements in complete lines of auto parts and components to be 
assembled at Chrysler plants in the U.S. 
Renault, MAN. American Motor Company and Fiat are all involved in business ties of 
one kind or another with Korean oomponert suppliers. 
(2) Export Marketing and Competitiveness of the Big Three Korean Automakers 
Hyundai's dramatic success in exports of its subcompact cars to *, North America 
started with its record-breaking sales of PONY II in Canada. PONY II 
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which had been introduced to the Canadian market in 1983 became the bestselling 
imported car in Canada in 1985 and 1986, far surpassing the Japanese subcorapacts like 
Honda, Toyoda or ^ te^a. 
Several factors account for such an unexpected success of the Korean 
subcompact cars in the Canadian auto market. 
First, the export price of the Korean car was lower because of lower 
labor cost, but the exterior design and product quality were quite comparable to the 
more expensive imported subcorapacts. Table III - 2 shows the breakdown of the unit 
price of PONY II (1.4 1 engine) estimated on the basis of the 1985 costs. The 
manufacture's unit price before excise taxes was about US$ 3,910(tbe 1985 price) of 
which labor costs occupied only 5 percent which could be made possible by low wage 
rate plus increasing automation of production process. According to a Japanese 
price comparison of the Japanse and the Korean suboompact cars in the 
Canadian market as of August, 1985, the basic model of PONY (1.4 1 engine) was priced 
at C$6,345, the comparable Toyota's basic model, TERCEL (1.5 1 engine) at C$6,959, 
Civic Honda (1.3 1) at C$6,635, and Nissan's Centra at C$8,075,respectively. 
Consumer's Association of Canada compared the consumers' response to the imported 
passenger cars as shown in Table III - 3. 
Second, Canada's preferential (low) tariff rate applicable to Korean cars was 
definitely a favorable factor in price competition. The Korean cars were imported 
duty-free by the end of 1986 under Canada's preferential system applicable to 
manufactured imports from developing countries. The tariff rate of 6 percent that is 
scheduled to be imposed on the Korean cars imported to Canada after 1987 is still 
lower than that imposed on imported cars from developed countries. 
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Table III - 2 The Breakdown of the Manufacturing Cost of 
the Korean Car (PONY II) as of Jan. 1985 
Costs 
teteriflls 
Labor 
Non-Labor Manufacting Cost 
Managerial & Sales Costs 
Non-Business Expenses 
Profit from Production 
Manufacture's unit Cost 
before Taxes 
1,000 fen 
2,503 
163 
226 
78 
71 
149 
3,256 (=iE$3,910) 
Notes : U.S. $100 = 827 won (Jan., 1985) 
Source : Dong - A Ilbo (Daily), Jan. 5, 1985 
Table III - 3 The Consumer's Response to the Imported Cars (%) 
N.American Cars 
Japanese Cars 
European Cars 
Korean Cars 
Very Satisfied 
64.1 
83.7 
67.7 
84.4 
Moderately Satisfied 
26.2 
12.9 
21.2 
11.1 
Unsatisfied 
9.7 
3.4 
11.2 
4.4 
Sonroe : Quoted from data released by Korea Automotive 
Industry Cb-Operative Industry 
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Third, there was a gap (or shortage) in the supply of low-prioed imported 
suixanpaot cars created by voluntary export restric tions on Japanese cars at the 
very time when Hyundai was exporting its TONY II suboompacts to Canada. 
Fourth, a downward adjustment in the structure of interest rates was made 
in Canada from 1984 on, which made easier for consumers to purchase passenger cars. 
The timing of Hyundai's entry into the Canadian . market coincided 
with the interest-rate fall and the subsequent upswing of consumer demand for 
cars. 
Fifth, Hyundai's announcement of its plan to establish its own assembly plant in 
Newmarket in Ontario created a good corporate image of Hyundai among Canadian 
consumers : Hyundai is responsible for what it has sold and ready to service the 
cars it has sold with autoparts and components made in Canada. 
Sixth, since most buyers of suboorapact cars in Canada were first-time buyers, 
brandname loyalty was not yet working among them. 
The Canadian market for - imported subcompact cars turned out to be a valuable 
test market for Hyundai's subsequent entry into the U.S. market with PONY EXCELL and 
its variants like PRESTO. Encouraged by the unexpected sales of nearly 170,000 units 
of PONY EXCELL in the U.S. during the initial year (from August, 1985 to 
September, 1986), Hyundai targeted the sales of a quarter of million units of PONY 
EXCELL and its variants in the U.S. for its second year ending September, 1987. 
In fact, actual sales for the second year far exceeded the target sales by more than 
one hundred thonsand units. 
Several factors account for such a total success in the U.S. market for the 
Korean suboorapact cars from the beginning years. 
First, the export price of the front-wheel drive suboorapact, EXCELL, was 
relatively low for its up-to-date design and product quality. This point was 
already made in the case of Hyundai's successful initial entry into the Canadian car 
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market. 
Second, because of its successful sales performance in the Canadian market, the 
corporate image of Hyundai as a reputable small-car maker from Asia next to Japan was 
well established among the American consumers at the time of its entry into the U.S. 
market. 
Third, in April, 1985, Hyundai Motor America, the U.S. sales headquarter of 
Hyundai, was created with its nation-wide network of . exclusive dealerships. 
The well-performed and highly experienced independent dealers were selected for 
exclusive single dealership in large territory with sufficient profit incentives 
guaranteed through volume business. 
Fourth, as a consequence of the voluntary export restrictions cm Japanese 
oars, a gap in the supply of low-priced suboompact cars was also created in the U.S. 
car market, which Hyundai was to fill in with its PONY EXCELL. 
Daewoo, a CMC joint venture company, . started to export its own variant of 
the CMC world-car model, LEMANS, to the U.S. through CMC's Pontiac distribution 
network in mid-1887 . LEMANS, an attractively designed and highly-performing 
suboompact car with many new engineering features is considered by many car experts to 
be one of best-selling imported cars in the U.S market. An explosive sales record of 
LEMANS in the Korean market, which is priced more than 15 percent higher than EXCELL, 
and a favourable reception in the U.S clearly üustrates this. ~'~^' 
The company plans to sell 80,000 to 100,000 unit of LEMANS in the U.S. 
through the Pontiac distribution channels during the initial year of 1987/88. 
Kia, which had regaind its vitality through successful sales of small trucks and 
van wagons in local market in the last five years, resumed production of passenger 
cars from the beginning of 1987 withtte introduction of FESTIVA for the export market 
and PRIDE for the local market. Both FESTIVA and PRIDE are an identical, lower-priced 
smaller suboompact car similar to Honda Civic in exterior design and performance. The 
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consumer reception of PRIDE in the local market is quite favorable for the good 
corporate image of Kia, the low price and fuel economy of PRIDE and the low repair 
cost records of all the previous Kia-made vehicles. For 1987, Kia plans to sell about 
40,000 units of FESTIVA in the U.S. markst through the Ford distribution network. 
With the planned exports of 410 thousand units of subcompact cars by the three 
Korean automakers to the U.S. for 1987, the U.S. market for suboompacts will be 
crowded with nearly one million cars mostly assembled overseas as indicated in Table 
III - 4. General Motor, Ford and Chrysler are all coming up with their own models of 
suboompacts assembled in the U.S., Japan, and England. Brazil, Yugoslavia, Malaysia 
and Thailand are also entering the U.S. auto market with low-priced subomaots. The 
outcome of sales performance in the U.S. suboompact market for the year of 1987 and 
1988 is particularly crucial to Kia and Daewoo, because the two companies as new 
entrants must secure a foothold in the U.S. market at the very time when the U.S. 
suboompact market is overcrowded. Furthermore, all the three Korean automakers find 
it critical to attain decent market shares in the U.S. as soon as' possible in 
view of the likelihood that voluntary export restrictions of some kind similar to 
those currently imposed on Japanese car exports would be eventually imposed on 
their car exports to the U.S. market. 
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Table III - 4 The 1987 Prospective Sales of Small Gars under U.S. $6.000 
Company 
G. M. C. 
G. M. C. 
Yugo 
Proton 
Volkswagen 
Subaru 
Ford 
Hyundai 
Mitsubishi 
Honda 
Toyoda 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Daewoo 
Model 
Sprint 
Chevett 
GV.CVX 
Saga 
Volks 
Justy 
Festiva 
Excell 
Free Size 
Civio 
Teros LEZ 
Colt 
Omni America 
Lemons 
Base Price 
5,995 
4,990 
3,995 
4,890 
5,690 
5,495 
5,765 
5,195 
5,195 
5,799 
5,848 
5,949 
5,799 
5,999 
Country 
of Production 
Japan 
England 
Yugoslavia 
Malaysia 
Brazil 
Japan 
Korea 
Korea 
Korea 
Japan 
Japan 
Japan 
U. S. A. 
Korea 
Total 
Prospective 
Sales (unit) 
60,000 
— 
70,000 
— 
50,000 
15,000 
40,000 
250,000 
30,000 
150,000 
26,000 
95,000 
80,000 
100,000 -
966,000 
Source : Maeil Economic Daily, March 10, 1987. 
Despite a very good sales record of the Korean suboompaot cars in the Canadian and 
the U.S. markets in recent years, the Japanese car sales representives in the U.S. are 
optimistic, according to a recent account in a Japanese business weekly, about the 
competitive advantages of the Japanese subcompacts over the Korean cars in the U.S. 
They have pointed out ""''"" two critical competitive edges in Japan's 
favor. First, the resale value of the Japanese cars is very high in Canada and the 
U.S. The resale value of a one and a half year old Japanese car in Canada is about 
75-80 percent of the new car price, whereas that of the comparable Korean oar would be 
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around 50 percent, lbs situation would be similar in the U.S. second-hand car market, 
according to the same souroe. Second, about 90 percent of the American buyers of the 
more expensive Japanese suboorapact would be the upper and middle income families who 
have access to low-cost credit financing, whereas only 45 percent of those who 
purchase the inexpensive Korean cars would have the same kind of low-cost financing 
access« The remaining 55 percent of them would bs add to low-income families 
who, because of their low credit ratings, would have to pay higher interest costs for 
credit finaoing arranged by individual car dealers.*) 
These points precisely reveal the two crucial tests the Korean-made cars must pass 
in the U.S. auto market now and in near future. One is technical reliability plus 
physical durability, and the other is marketing oçertise plus credit arrangement. The 
future success of the Korean cars in overseaSmarkets will depend on how to pass these 
crucial tests. 
*) Nikkei Business Weekly (in Japanese), PP.14 - 15, Dee. 8, 1986. 
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IV. Corporate Strategies and Industrial Relations 
Much cf vtet has been said in the previous section can be put together to 
disclose various aspects of the oorpor ate strategies of the Korean car manufactures. 
In this section, such scattered pieces of information will be brought together to see 
how the Korean car manufacturers have pursued their respective corporate strategies. 
It goes without saying that in formulating and pursuing their strategies, the car 
manufacturers must take into account their internal capabilities such as technology and 
financial capabilities, manpower resources, and marketing expertise, and the external 
environment including both local and overseas government regulations affecting the car 
industry, overseas and local market conditions, new trends in world-wide automotive 
technology, and so on. 
1) International Alliance Strategy 
As pointed out in section III, all the three major car manufacturers have been 
allied with foreign partners in joint ventures, joint production, technological 
licensing agreements and overseas marketing arrangements with varying degrees of 
intensity. From its inception, Daewoo has been a 50:50 joint business venture company 
between GMC and the Korean partner. Mitsubushi of Japan recently took a minority share 
of 10 percent in the equity capital of Hyundai Motor Co., and Toyogogio of Japan (the 
maker of hfeztfe. models) took also the 10 percent share of Kia* s euity capital. These 
foreign partners have been deeply involved in joint product development and 
technological licensing agreements with Korean oar manufacturers. LEMANS, a basic 
world-oar model of new type was jointly developed by German and American GMC 
technical talents and . Korean counterparts. FESTIVA (PRIDE Is local brand name) was 
jointly developed by altefe- and Kia team. Hyundai purchased licensing agreements 
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from Mitsubishi for assign and know-how of engine blocks and other essential 
components of PONY EXCELL and its variants. 
All the Korean car manufacturers are also involved in shared production of cars 
and/or components with their respective foreign partners. Dewoo and Kia are also 
exporting their passenger cars to the United States through their partners' 
distributionchannels. In other words, they act as original equipment manufacturers 
(OEM) for GMC and Ford, respectively. It is Hyundai alone which has established its 
own overseas sales network through exclusive dealership arrangements in the U.S. and 
Canada. 
The Korean car Manufacturers' international alliance can be considered as the basic 
corporate strategy to overcome their weaknesses in advanoed automotive technology, 
financial resources and marketing expertise and to take advantage of their low-cost 
labor and manufacturing capability in their attempt to expand car exports in uncertain 
and ever -changing overseas market environment. 
2) Souroing 
One can note varying degrees of difference in sourcing policies among the Korean 
car manufactureres. Daewoo is procuring components and parts through over three 
hundred affiliated and independent suppliers not only for . its own passenger cars but 
also for the overseas GMC component suppliers like Fisher and others. Hyundai tends to 
establish .r own affiliates for production of engines and major components. Both 
Hyundai and Daewoo Motor Companies are integral parts of their respective business 
groups (conglomerates) comprising a number of establishments in diverse lines of 
business. They are able to directly produce a large portion of major components and 
materials within their own business group. Kia is a single business entity which has 
been long specialized in small trucks, micro-vans, and passenger cars. It naturally 
tends to rely for the supply of components and parts on a number of independent outside 
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suppliers. 
Thus, one cam note that the different size and business structure of the oar 
manufacturers has led to different pattern of sourcing policies. 
3) Product Mix 
Though the three car manufacturers are producing passenger cars for both local and 
over seas markets, each of them has a different product mix. Hyundai, for instance, 
has remained a single most important manufacturer of small cars in Korea since "the 
early 1970* s, although the company has recently diversified into ptxirtim cf 
heavy trucks and large-sized buses. Kia's main line of business is still production of 
small-sized trucks and vans mainly for local market. The company resumed small car 
production only in the beginning of 1987. Daewoo has been long specialized in compact 
and medium-sized GMC cars and heavy-duty GMC trucks mainly for local market. The 
company started production of export-oriented subcompacts, LEMANS, in late 1986. 
4) R & D Strategy 
As indicated in previous sections, all three car jnanufacturers have been 
relying on foreign partners for advanced automotive technology. One can, however, note 
a trace of different intensity in indigenous R&D efforts among the three manufacturers. 
Daewoo5 s R&D efforts are largely tied with the global strategy of the CMC world-car 
development because of its affiliation with GMC. Because of its relatively weak 
financial structure and long affiliation with Nkftfe, Kia has been relying on Mazda. 
for developing a new suboompaot model like FESTIVA (PRIDE) and improving the existing 
models of medium-sized passenger cars, vans and small trucks initially developed and 
marked in Japan by Ifezûsu 
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Hyundai is much more active than its local competitors in endigenous R&D efforts to 
develop its own models. The technological licensing arrangements it has made with 
foreign partners are confined to selected areas of specific design technology far 
production of passenger cars and components. 
Such a difference in technology strategy among the car manufacturers reflects, in 
large measure , a difference in the extent of foreign share participation, financial 
resources, and organizational size and structure of these companies. 
5) Management-Labor Relations 
From its inception in 1962 to the second half of 1987 when the ever-intensifying 
student and civilian protest movement against the repressive government of Generals 
Park and Chun culminated in the restoration of political freedom, the Korean car 
industry enjoyed the advantage of relatively strike-free tranquility in management -
labor relations. For the period from 1962 to 1972, the year when President Park 
staged a political coup "Ébrouai constitutional amendments for his life-time unlimited 
political power, the labor market for industrial workers in South Korea could be 
largely characterized by labor surplus conditions. Workers were competing to find 
employment in automotive assembly plants because the scale of wages and fringe benfits 
paid by the Korean car manufacturers were considered to exceed far above the average 
wage level of manufacturing sector as a whole. The Korean labor laws prevailing before 
1972 which had been modeled after the Western European labor laws were considered to 
be too "liberal" to be practical in the Korean reality. Both management and labor 
sides did not bother too much with the legal aspects of labor disputes, most of which 
were then related to defaults cr back-wage payments due to business failures by small 
and medium enterprises. Labor unions were neither organized nor recognized in many 
industrial enterprises. Labor unions formally organized in large enterprises were 
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either nominal or accused cf becoming "friendly" to management sides. 
As the labor market was becoming gradually tight from the mid-1970's, the frequency 
of labor disputes was increasing. The government soon came to intervene in labor 
disputes mostly in favor of the management side in the name of maintaining "law and 
order" and "national security." Labor strikes and any other forms of collective 
- resistance were prohibited under a new series of emergency labor laws from the 
mid-1970*s through '" mid-1987. During this period of authoritarian rule by the 
miütaay leaders, only a small number of labor disputes surfaced in the Korean car 
industry. Any incidents of strikes and collective protests were instantly crushed by 
police force with or without the management consent. Under these circumstances, the 
task of maintaining industrial peace fell into the hand of the government as integral 
part of maintaining "nationl security." Wiile labor unions' bargaining power was weak 
in wage negotiations and disputes in the car industry, the average level of wages and 
other compensations and working conditions at assembly plants were largely considered 
to be better than those in other manufacturing industries. Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that very few regular employees were fired or laid off in both Hyundai and 
Daewoo. Work force reduction at assembly plants during business recessions was carried 
out in the forms of attrition and intra-group trnasfer of workers in the cases of 
Hyundai and Daewoo Groups. Kia which was a single business entity specializing in 
automotive production suffered from mounting debt, subsequent bankrupcy, and the 
resulting inability to pay back-wages to its workers, which led to the protracted 
labor-management disputes during the recession of 1980 and 82. The bankrupcy and labor 
disputes were finally resolved when 90 percent of the ownership shares of the company 
were transfered to its emplyees together with the management takeover by 
representatives of emplyees under the bank guarantee of loan payment rescheduling and 
additional loans. 
Political upheaval and democratic reform movement during the seocni . half of 1987 
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marked a new decisive turning point in labor-management relations in South Korea . 
New labor unions have been organized from grassroots under militant and radical 
leadership which replaced the existing unions and their moderate leadership for all 
practical purposes. Hundreds of labor strikes and collective protests were staged in 
large and medium enterprises across almost all industries. Labor unions in the car 
industry succeeded in an increase of 15-20 percent in wages and benefits in the fall of 
1987. Another round of labor-management negotiations and disputes for wage increase 
and improvement of working conditions began in the spring of 1988. Labor strikes 
are taking place at all the four auto assembly plants cf Daewoo as of mid-April, 
1988. The union is demanding a 26 percent wage hike while the management is 
offering a 17 percent increase. In the meantime, the company is losing six hundred 
units of Lemans due to the current strike, precisely at the moment when the dmand for 
Leroans in the U.S. and Korean markets is greater than ever. Following Daewoo, Hyundai 
is likely to face labor strikes in its auto assembly and component manufacturing 
plants. Kia which has long enjoyed strike-free management-labor relations will have to 
eventually make upward adjustments in wages and compensations in line with new wage 
scales settled by Hyundai and Daewoo. 
Money wage level of assembly workers in the Korean car industry was increased by 
15-20 percent in the fall of 1987 and is likely to increase by 18 - 20 percent again in 
the spring of 1988. Some industry experts tend to view such two oonsequetive wage 
increases within the last eigth monhts as lump-sum upward adjustment of the real income 
of industrial workers which had been long suppressed by the repressive government. 
Pressure for wage increases in the car industry in the foreseeable future, accord ing 
to industry experts, is likely to be moderate in view of several economic forces 
working in Korea's industrial labor market : (a) increasing annual inflow of new 
participants (highschool and college graduates) in labor market, (b) shift of labor 
force from low-wage to high-wage industries through rapid industrial 
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restructuring, due to accelerated revaluation of local currency and real wage irrrease 
and (3) wide spread acceleration of automation and mechanization of assembly plants 
by car manufao turers and component suppliers. 
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V. Factors in International Expansion of the Korean Car Industry 
Several factors operating both on the supply and the demand sides account for 
the transformation of the Korean car industry into an export-oriented 
industry since 1983. 
1) Supply-Side Factors 
(a) The Low Labor Cost of Production 
Since the basic elements of automotive technology has been known for more than a 
century, and since the low-priced small car has become a standardized (mature) product, 
it is the comparative advantge of low factor (particularly labor) cost of production 
which is a key determinant in international shift in location of automobil productive 
capacity, as expounded by Professor Vernon and his followers over a quarter century 
ago. The comparative advantage in the low-cost production of suboompact cars has been 
shifting from Western Europe in I960's to Japan in the 1970*s, and to the NICs, 
including Brazil and South Korea in the 1980*s. In the case of Korea, the low-wage 
cost of well-educated and semi-skilled labor is the single most important factor in 
maintaining the country's competitive edge in small car production. 
As shown in Table V-l, the labor cost of the Korean car industry was estimated to 
be 11 percent of its U.S. counterpart, 61 percent of its West German counterpart, and 
27 percent of its Japanese counterpart, respectively. It was still one half of its 
Brazilian (24 percent) and Mexican (22 percent) competitors. These figures are 
somewhat outdated, but the fact that the Korean oar industry has a comparative 
advantage in labor cost still holds true in the case of the Korean car industry despite 
sharp upward wage adjustments of 30 - 40% in the last eight months. 
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y-i International Comparison of Automobile Production Costs. 
U. S. A. 
W.Germany 
Japan 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Korea 
Wage Rate Per Hour 
(U.S. dollar) 1) 
19.37 
12.89 
7.24 
3.53 
3.66 
1.95 
Productivity 2) 
1.00 
1.10 
1.40 
0.85 
0.80 
0.90 
Relative Labor 
Cost 3) 
1.00 
0.61 
0.27 
0.22 
0.24 
0.11 
Source : Jagongbo No. 57 (Oct. 1986), 
Korea Automotive Inodustry Co-operative Association 
Notes : 1) The 1982 U.S. dollar value based on the U.S. Dept of Labor estimates 
2) The Economist Intelligence Unit (Londou) estimates 
3) Relative labor cost = hourly wage X (1 / productivity) 
U.S. hourly wge (U.S.$19.37) 
V - 2 Composite Manufaturing Cost Statement 
(three nsdn aibaœitezs) 
Current Gross Manufacturing Cost 
Materials & Parts 
Labor Cost 
Basic Pay 
Allowances 
Other Expenses 
Inventory Adjustments 
Other Adjustments 
Current Net Mfg Cost 
1980 
100.0 
82.4 
8.6 
8.1 
9.0 
9.1 
6.5 
91.8 
Composition Ratio (%) 
1981 
100.0 
82.6 
8.3 
7.5 
0.8 
9.1 
9.3 
2.2 
97.3 
1982 
100.0 
82.9 
7.7 
6.4 
1.4 
9.4 
7.1 
5.5 
94.9 
1983 
100.0 
81.6 
9.1 
6.0 
3.0 
9.4 
5.4 
4.7 
95.1 
1984 
100.0 
85.4 
7.3 
5.2 
2.2 
7.2 
4.2 
4.5 
94.4 
1985 
100.0 
85.7 
7.1 
5.9 
1.1 
7.3 
2.7 
10.7 
89.4 
1986 
100.0 
90.1 
4.8 
2.9 
1.8 
5.1 
2.5 
6.9 
92.6 
Va 
(mi Hit 
19! 
2,905 
2,62: 
13Í 
8! 
K 
14Í 
7. 
20( 
2,6» 
Sources : Bank of Korea : Annual Report of Enterprise Management Analysis (1979 - 87) 
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According to the composite manufacturing cost statement of the three automakers 
estimated by the Bank of Korea, the average share of labor cost in total manufacturing 
cost has shown a downward trend from the peak of 9.1 percent in 1983 to 7.1 percent in 
1985 and down to 4.8 percent in 1986, as shown in Table V-2. Table V-3 shows that the 
share of labor cost in value added of the auto makers has remained slightly below 50 
peroent from 1982 on. A detailed breakdown of wages according to skill classification 
is not available from the auto manufacturers. From Table V-4, one can read annual wage 
and salary bills per employee of the auto industry over time. Real wages per employee 
as expressed in the 1980 constant U.S. dollars increased from U.S.$3,787 in 1981, to 
U.S.$5,619 in 1982, to U.S. $6,811 in 1983, to U.S.$7,420 in 1984 and to U.S.$7,667 in 
1985. It fell, however,sharply to U.S.$6,417 in 1986. Reasons for such a sharp drop in 
real wage for emplyee are not clear, but one can suspect that a sharp increase in the 
number of. newly hired low-wage workers to meet increasing export demand may partly 
account for such a drop in real wage level. Taking into account an increase of 30 
percent to 40 percent in nominal wage rates of auto industrial workers during the 
recent labor-management disputes, the real wage level in 1988 will exceed the 1985 
level, but not very much. 
An immediate and most conspicuous factor working in favor of the relative cost 
position of the Korean auto industry was the dramatic upward revaluation of the 
Japanese yen, which made Korean cars comparatively cheaper. But such a temporary 
advantage is rapidly eroding as the up ward revaluation of the Korean won has been, and 
will be, very much accelerating throughout 1988. 
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(b) Economies of Scale and Learning Effects 
As indicated in Table II - 3, the productive capacity of the Korean auto industry 
has been rapidly expanding since 1983 when the exports of passenger cars started to 
grow sharply. During 1987, Hyundai expanded its productive capacity to the level of 
700,000 cars/year, Daewoo to 330,000 cars/year, and Kia to 150,000 
cars/year. If a minimum efficient isveL for realizing economies of scale for a single 
car model is assumed to be 500,000 cars/year, it is still Hyundai alone which has 
reached that level. This may be one of main reasons why Hyundai has been directly 
exporting its passenger cars with its own brand name through its own distribution 
network in the North America. Daewoo and Kia are indirectly exporting their passenger 
cars as original equipment manufacturers (OEM) through General Motors and Ford, 
respectively. As frequently pointed out by economists, a small country (like South 
Korea) with limited local market for passenger cars and insufficient stock of 
technological know-tow can best specialize in low-cost, standardized (undifferentiated) 
small cars for both export and local markets to attain international competitiveness 
through economies of scale. This is preoisely the pattern of international expansion 
that the Korean auto industry has so far followed in last several years. 
The falling average cost of passenger oars results from falling fixed cost 
through indivisibility of plants and equipment and from productivity growth through 
specialization of labor and equipment. But such economies of scale are meaningful 
only under static conditions, under dynamic conditions, technology level, factor 
costs, material prices, and external economic circumstances are subject to changes. Of 
these factors, the effect of learning by doing (i.e. X-effioienoy) and the effort to 
narrow the gap between the best and the average levels of technology in assembling 
lines and in production of automotive parts and components are important sources of 
productivity growth in the Korean car industry during the last five years of export 
expansion. 
- 4 1 -
(c) Growth of the Related Industries 
Snail passenger cars are assembled with more than 20,000 
oompletelyHarxioBd-down (CKD) parts and about 2,500 materials. Naturally, the car 
industry is closely linked for the supply of these parts and materials with iron and 
steel, metal fabrication, machinery, rubber, chemicals, textile, glass, electronics, 
and other industries. The technical level and productivity of the car industry is 
crucially dependent on the scale and technical level of these related industries of 
backward linkage type. Furthermore, plastic industry is increasingly important in 
connection with the industry's efforts to reduce the weight of cars. Computer industry 
is also closely linked with the car industry since computer system and electronic 
divices are increasingly incorporated into production of passenger cars. Thus, the 
extent and intensity of interrelatedness of the car industry with other industries 
continues to increase. 
Although a predominant portion (about 87 percent in value) of parts and materials 
for production of small passenger cars are locally supplied, the Korean car industry is 
lagging far behind its advanced-country counterparts in development of new basic 
materials and alternative engine blocks. But the prospect for incorporating electronic 
devices and computer system into cars and into process of oar production is somewhat 
promising. Electronic fuel injection system, electronically-controlled transmission, 
suspension and power steering systems, and other safety and convenience devices are 
expected to be locally produced with indigenous technology by 1990 or the early 1990's. 
(2) Demand-Side Factors 
(a) Similarity in Structure of Demand for Small Cars between Local and Overseas 
Markets 
A predominant majority of passenger oars in great demand by most Korean consumers 
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are falling into the category of "suboompact" cars, the ds mand for which has been 
also steadily growing in the U.S. market. U.S. consumer demand for suboompact 
cars, both locally produced and imported, was projected to reach more than 2.5 million 
units, or roughly 25 percent of total U.S. demand for passenger cars in 1987. Many 
factors account for the U.S. consumer preference for imported subcompacts : low 
import price, fuel economy
 í (between 25 and 44 MPG), increase in car-purchasing 
population of ages between 25 and 44, increased participation in labor force by women, 
smaller size of household, firm establishment of a suboompact as a second car, etc. 
Furthermore, as the import price of Japanese suboompact cars has risen sharply due to 
"voluntary" export restrictions and subsequent ' appreciation of the Japanese 
currency, a gap between supply of and demand for low-cost subcorapacts had been created 
which was soon to be filled by Korea-exported suboompaots. In short, the Korean small 
cars have met the basic conditions of the U.S. market demand for suboompaots : 
low-priced undifferentiated, practical cars especially suited to (a) the taste and 
budgets of the low-income American consumers, including the ycurg and working women 
who are purchasing thier own cars for the first time and (b) to the need of large 
middle - income families who are looking for inexpensive second cars. 
(b) Increase in Local Demand 
While it is true that rapid growth of Korea's car production has been almost 
entirely associated with rapid growth of car exports, local demand for passenger 
oars has also started to rise as the Korean economy has been oontinously growing and as 
new models of passenger cars are introduced in local markets. As of the end of 1986, 
the share of exports in total production of passenger oars reached 65.6 percent. There 
is, however, sufficient room for increase in domestic demand for passenger cars, 
considering the rising per capita inoome level and low ratio of oar owners to Korean 
population. The number of oar owners per 1,000 persons was 13.6 in Korea (in 1985), 
227.3 in Japan (1984), 416.7 in West Germany (1984), 434.8 in Canada (1984), and 555.6 
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in the U.S. (1984). The Korean figure is far below those of Mexico (63.3 persons) and 
Brazil (64.1 persons). 
Up to the present moment, several factors have discouraged the growth of local 
demand for passenger cars. First, the high rates of taxes and fees (including special 
consumption taxes, national defense tax, value-added tax, registration fees, licensing 
fees, government bond purchases etc.) imposed on the local purchase and 
operation of passenger cars. In addition, the high local price of gasoline which 
reflects high consumption tax has dampened potential demand for passenger cars. As 
shown in Table V-5, the ratio of taxes and fees imposed at the time of purchase to the 
factory price of pasenger car is 46.5 percent, and the ratio of annual taxes and fees 
for car operations to the factory price of passenger cars is 13.9 percent. These 
ratios are nearly twice as high as those of other countries. 
Second, the relatively small size of the national land, excessive urban 
concentration of population, and deficient road system in Korea are constraints to 
growth of local demand for passenger cars. 
Rising per capita income of the Korean consumers and high income elasticity of 
demand for passenger cars will eventually u sher in a phase of "mass motorization", 
once institutional constraints such as tax system and physical constraints such as 
deficient expr essway system and parking facilities are removed. 
Table V-5 International Comparison of Automobile Taxes and Fees 
Korea Jam) England ff. Germany 
at the time of purchase 46.5% 24.4% 26,5% 14.0% 
annual operations 13.9% 12.7% 6.7% 7.0% 
Sources : Hyundai Motor Company (1986) 
Notes : Percentage figure = total amount of taxes and fees 
factory price of car X 100% 
Korean cars : the class of 1,500 cc engines 
Foreign cars : the olass of 1,600 cc engines 
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VI. Problems Ahead 
lbs rapid transformation of the Korean oar industry into an export-oriented 
industry in the last five years has posed a host of problems at present and for 
foreseeable future. 
(a) Danger of Overcapacity 
Korean car manufactures have expanded, and are still expanding, their productive 
capacity somewhat beyond a limit considered feasible. As pointed out in Section II, 
the total demand for Korean paseenger cars for 1990 was projected to reach around 1.3 
million units, whereas the sum total of assembly plant capacities planned by the Korean 
manufacturers is around 2 million units, thus showing an excès capacity of 700,000 
units for the car industry as a whole. Such an excessive expansion of productive 
capacity can be accounted for by (1) an optimism based on unusually strong export 
demand and growing domestic demand in recent years and by (2) a calculated risks taken 
by the Korean car makers to attain economies of scale in production and decent shares 
of the U.S. suboompact market before the U.S. government imposes import quota in 
the form of Japanese-style "voluntary restrictions" on Korean-exported cars. 
In view of the limited capacity of local car market to absorb the expanded supply 
potentials, a predominant proportion of passenger oars has to be exported, thus raising 
the export dependence of the Korean oar industry to a dangerously high level. Such a 
high degree of export dependence will weaken the industry's ability to make adjustment 
to changes in export demand, causing cyclical and chronic instability associated with 
under-utiliaation of productive capacity and unemployment. 
To deal with the problem of overcapacity, one can think of several lines of 
attack . 
First, a voluntary consultative body must be formed among the Korean automakers to 
avoid overlapping investments in plants and equipment. A recent move among the Korean 
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automakers toward shared production of auto parts in common use is a case in point. 
Second, the industry must strengthen the capacity to collect and up-to-date 
information on world-wide demand for and supply of passenger cars in order to 
strengthen the base for flexible adjustment in productive capacity to chsigirg overseas 
markst conditions. 
Third, domestic demand for passenger cars must be encouraged through tax reforms 
and improvement of road system and parking facilities. 
(b) Backwardness of Component Suppliers 
Technical backwardness and financial weakness of autmotive component suppliers can 
be considered as a serious threat to the growth and qualitative improvement of the 
Korean car industry. Several factors •"~r".' account for such an imbalance in supply 
capacity and technical level between suppliers and oar ¡manufactures. First, an 
exessively large number of financially-weak small suppliers facing insufficient market 
demand cannot possibly attain economies of scale in production. Second, division of 
labor and specialization is not well developed among suppliers and between suppliers 
and auto makers. Furthermore, as a number of large enterprises have come to newly 
participate in production and ex port of automotive parts and components, they have 
made overlapping and duplicative investments in plants and equipment in the 
over-crowded component industry. Small suppliers have, thus, suffered firm excessive 
competition and idle capacity. Third, the quality of autamative parts produced in 
Korea is not yet good enough for the use of overseas original equipment manufacturers. 
Most of Korean - made parts and components are exported for the use of repair services. 
The Korean automakers are partly equipping their export cars with imported foreign 
parts to ensure their quality. Fourth, Korean suppliers have not made sufficient 
investment for technical improvement. The levels of designing, heat treatment, and 
coating technologies are far below international standards. Financial constraints, 
excessive price competition, scarcity of technical manpower . , and weak local 
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base of science and technology are responsible for low R&D investment activities among 
part suppliers. Instead of making indigenous R&D efforts, they have opted an easy 
way-out : technical licensing agreements with foreign counterparts and occasional 
technical assistance from local automakers. Fifth, basic materials for automotive 
parts, such as steel, aluminum, plastics, rubber, and asbetos, are locally available, 
but high-priced and of low-quality. About 20 percent of basic materials required for 
production of automotive parts are imported, but their prices are rather high due to 
high import duties. 
To deal with these problems, the following measures can be considered. 
First, technical assistane from affiliated automakers and from professional 
research institutes should be strengthened. 
Second, each supplier should be made to specialize in a small number of specific 
automotive parts and be permitted to supply their specialized parts to all 
automakers so that the supplier may attain economies of scale and quality improvement. 
In other words, a new system of horizontal specialization among suppliers and between 
suppliers and automakers should be developed. 
Ihiid, indigeous R&D expenditures, technical licensing arrangements and joint 
ventures with foreign partners should be combined to help develop essential basic 
materials needed for production of automotive parts. 
3) Technical Constraints 
As pointed out in Section II, the Korean car industry is far behind its advanced 
-country countsparts in design technology and production automation. The industry is 
largely relying on imported foreign design technology. The extent of automation in 
production process at car assembly lines in Korea is in the range of 20 percent to - 40 
percent, depending on specific areas of operations. The corresponding figures in the 
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advanced countries is between 70 percent and 80 percent. Since the advanced-country 
car manufacturers are reluctant to transfer advanced technologies in design 
and other vital areas to developing-oountry counterparts, the technological gap 
between the advanced countries and Korea is widened rather than narrowed. Such a trend 
is expected to continue for foreseeable future. 
To meet these basic challenges, the following measure are recommended : 
First, indigenous R&D investment activities should be expanded. 
Second, research manpower should be secured to meet indigenous R&D needs. As of 
the end of 1985, there were nine research institutes established by three automakers 
and six suppliers, and 2.200 research workers employed in these institutes. The number 
of research institutes and research manpower ' is likely to increase rapidly in near 
future. 
Third, efforts should be made to increase inflow of advanced automotive techno -
logies along with local R&D efforts. In view of the advanced-country auto makers' 
reluctance to make the state-of-art automotive technologies available to their develop-
ing-country counterparts, the forms of technological transfer should be diversified 
including joint ventures, subcontracting, and shared production, in addition to 
technological licensing. 
4) Danger of Import Restrictions 
Korea's exports of passenger cars have been concentrated into the U.S. and Canada. 
Such regional concentration of ever-increasing car exports is likely to bring about 
non-tariff restrictions on the import of Korean-made cars by the governments of import-
ing countries. The following measures can be taken to reduce the risk of non-tariff 
import restrictions : 
First, overseas direct investment by Korean automakers should be encouraged in 
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those countries where Korea's car exports are concentrated. In addition to the 
advantages of overcoming import restrictions on assembled cars, overseas direct 
investment in the advanced countries would not only enable Korean automakers to get 
nearer to the markets where their products are sold, but also to gain access to 
advanced automobile technologies and engineering know-how available in these countries. 
Second, in the long run, the present pattern of quantitative expansion of 
low-priced subcompact exports will have to be replaced by diversified exports of 
high-quality compact and medium-sized cars. 
Third, since the opening of new export markets for passenger cars and the 
establisnhment of sales and after-service network overseas are considered to be a 
formidable task for medium-sized Korean automakers, joint operations in production and 
marketing with foreign partners would be best suited. 
5) Risks from Changing Overseas Demand and Capital Requirement 
Business risks associated with uncertainty in automobile demand overseas are great 
in view ofttelong time period required for development of a new model and huge capital 
cost incurred due to indivisibility of plants and equipment for automobile production. 
Uncertainty on demand side and cost requirements on supply side may be too great for an 
average Korean automaker to assume all by himself. 
Korean carmakers' active participation in technological licensing agreemants, joint 
ventures, marketing arrangements and financial and production sharing with foreign 
automakers in recent years can be in part considered as an effort to reduce such great 
business risks associated with danaxL uncertainty and huge cost requirements. Kia's 
entry into the U.S. car market under the Ford's brand-name of FESTIVA through Ford's 
distribution network is a case in point where low production cost of the Korean 
automakers and Japanese Technology (Kfeafe,.) are combined with marketing network and 
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financial power of Ford. Daewoo's entry into the U.S. car market under* the GHC 
brand-name of LEMANS is also the same case in point where Daewoo's low production cost 
is combined with the German GMC's world-car technology and the U.S. GMC's marketing 
network. 
• 
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